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harness

A coding agent harness in Go. Point it at a repository, tell it to make the failing test pass, and measure how often it actually does.

The code is the byproduct. The deliverable is METRICS.md. PLAN.md is the build plan this follows.

Quick start

export ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=sk-ant-...
go build -o harness ./cmd/harness

./harness -C /path/to/a/throwaway/clone          # full-screen TUI
./harness -C /path/to/repo -p "why does TestFoo fail?"   # one prompt

A different endpoint — a gateway, a proxy, a local server speaking the Messages API:

./harness -base-url http://127.0.0.1:4000 -api-key ... -C .
# or ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL / ANTHROPIC_API_KEY / ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN

Flags override the environment. -auth-token sends Authorization: Bearer, which is what OAuth tokens and most gateways want; -api-key sends x-api-key. A non-default endpoint announces itself on stderr, because your prompt and every file the agent reads go wherever that URL points.

Useful flags: -model, -effort low|medium|high|xhigh|max, -max-turns, -resume latest, -no-stream, -no-cache, -v, -yolo, -no-tui, -no-skills.

The TUI

On a terminal, the interactive mode is a full-screen Bubble Tea app. It opens on a welcome block naming the model, the endpoint and the root, and settles into a transcript above a prompt:

⏺ Let me see what the test expects before changing anything.

⏺ ReadFile(path=internal/agent/loop_test.go)
  ⎿ 1: package agent
    …

⏺ EditFile(path=internal/agent/compact.go)
  4 additions, 1 removal
  @@ -50,7 +50,9 @@
  +    if window == 0 {

 ✢ Noodling… (14s · turn 3 · ↓ 1.3k tokens · esc to interrupt)   ● high · /effort
╭──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╮
│ › _                                                                          │
╰──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────╯
 joni   ✳ Opus 5   ◐ 62.2k (6%)   ↑ 4.2k ⟳ 58.0k ↓ 1.3k  $0.0835
 ⏵ approvals on (shift+tab to cycle) · /help for commands

Every event hangs off a dot in the left gutter, and everything belonging to it is indented under that dot, so a screen of tool output still reads as a sequence of things that happened. Diffs are shown in full and in colour with a count of what changed; other output is elided after six lines.

The status bar reports the context gauge — the last turn's input size against the window, which drops when the conversation is compacted — and separates fresh input tokens from cache reads, because the gap between the two is what METRICS.md is about. The prompt box grows with what you type, up to six lines.

KeyDoes
entersend
ctrl+jnewline without sending
shift+tabcycle the approval mode
ctrl+rexpand elided tool output
pgup/pgdnscroll the transcript
escinterrupt the turn
ctrl+cinterrupt the turn; again when idle to exit

Commands: /allowed, /clear, /help, /exit, /skills.

shift+tab cycles between asking before every mutating call and accepting them all, which is -yolo reached from the keyboard. The mode line says which is in force at all times, and the switch is recorded in the transcript, because a mode that silently lets the agent write to disk is not one to keep in a corner.

Approvals appear inline as a bordered prompt, answered by number or by the key in brackets — y, n, a for this exact command, t for the whole tool. The agent goroutine blocks until you answer, which is the point: the tool has not run yet. Interrupting while that prompt is open denies the call and cancels the turn rather than leaving the agent waiting on a channel nobody will read.

The TUI is skipped automatically when stdin or stdout is not a terminal, and by -p and -no-tui, which use the line-based renderer instead. Both front ends consume the same agent.Event stream, so neither can show something the other cannot.

Driving it without an API key

internal/tui/testdata/mockapi is a fake Messages API that streams a canned reply and asks to run a shell command, which is enough to exercise streaming, tool rendering, approve, deny and interrupt for nothing:

go run ./internal/tui/testdata/mockapi &
mkdir -p /tmp/demo && git -C /tmp/demo init -q
go build -o harness ./cmd/harness
./harness -C /tmp/demo -base-url http://127.0.0.1:8899 -api-key mock

Type anything, and the approval prompt appears. -slow 150ms stretches the stream out if you want to watch the spinner or test ctrl+c mid-turn. It sits under testdata so ./... ignores it.

Tools

ToolApprovalNotes
read_fileautomaticNumbered lines, offset/limit for paging
globautomaticNewest first; *.go matches at any depth
grepautomaticripgrep when present, pure Go otherwise, identical output either way
edit_filepromptsRequires a prior read; refuses ambiguous matches; returns a diff
write_filepromptsWhole files only; separate from edit_file so the metrics stay honest
bashpromptsOwn process group, killed whole on timeout; output capped head and tail

Skills

A skill is a directory of instructions the agent pulls in when it is relevant:

~/.agents/skills/commit-helper/SKILL.md      every repo
./.agents/skills/commit-helper/SKILL.md      this one, checked in
---
name: commit-helper
description: Use when writing commit messages for this repo
---

Read the last twenty commits for tone before writing anything.
Conventions are in references/conventions.md.

The directory name is the skill's name, and a name: that disagrees with it is a load error. Only the description reaches the model until the skill is invoked, so it is what decides whether the skill fires at all; the body can be as long as you like.

Two ways in, one way to load. The agent calls the skill tool when a description matches what it is doing; you can force one with /commit-helper fix the flaky test, which the model answers by making the same call. /skills lists what was found, project shadowing personal on a name collision.

Skill directories are readable by read_file, glob and grep even though they sit outside the working root, so a skill can ship reference files and point at them. They are not writable by anything: edit_file, write_file and bash keep the working root as their only root. A skill is input, not a work product.

Relative paths still anchor to the working root, so a skill pointing at its own files is read with the directory the skill tool prints joined on. If the model forgets, the "no such file" it gets back names the skill directories, which is usually enough to recover on the next turn. A shadowed skill's directory is not readable — only the skills actually in play widen anything.

Discovery happens at startup. The name-and-description listing goes in the cached prompt prefix, so re-reading the directory each turn would cost a cache miss on every turn for a file that never changes. Restart to pick up a new skill. -no-skills turns the whole thing off; the eval runner never discovers skills at all, so METRICS.md is unaffected by what is in your home directory.

Evals

./evals/selftest.sh    # no API calls: checks the tasks measure something
go run ./evals -n 3    # the real thing

Ten tasks, a fresh temp directory per run, full transcripts under evals/runs/<timestamp>/. See METRICS.md.

Safety

Three layers, in increasing order of how much they actually protect you.

Path jail. Every path a tool is given is resolved with filepath.EvalSymlinks and refused if it lands outside the working root, including through a symlink that points out of the tree. Cheap, and it catches a lot.

Approval prompts. Read-only tools run unattended. bash, edit_file and write_file ask, with "yes / no / always this exact one / always this tool" and session memory. /allowed lists what you have agreed to.

Shell commands are parsed with mvdan.cc/sh/syntax so the prompt can tell you what a command will actually run — git status; rm -rf ~ is shown as running both git and rm. This is not a security boundary, and the harness does not pretend otherwise: a command containing $(...), backticks, or an interpreter with -c cannot be analysed at all, so it is marked opaque and "always allow this exact command" is refused for it. String-matching allowlists for shell commands do not work; this exists to make the prompt specific, not to make the decision for you.

A sandbox. This is the layer that actually contains a mistake, and the harness cannot provide it for you. The honest recipe on Linux:

podman run --rm -it \
  -v "$PWD":/work:Z -w /work \
  -e ANTHROPIC_API_KEY \
  docker.io/library/golang:1.26 \
  /work/harness -C /work -yolo

Decide about egress explicitly. The container above has network access, because the harness needs to reach the API — which means the agent's bash has it too. That is the line between "broke my repo" and "read my .env and made an HTTP request". If that matters for the tree you are pointing it at:

  • Treat every secret reachable from inside the container as exposed.
  • Use a token scoped to nothing else, and a clone rather than your working tree.
  • For real isolation, run the harness on the host and put only bash in a network-less namespace. That is not implemented here.

-yolo skips every prompt. It is correct inside a container or against a throwaway clone, and wrong everywhere else. The eval runner sets it, because it is headless and operates on a temp directory it created.

Layout

cmd/harness      flag parsing, wiring, REPL
internal/llm     Messages API: types, HTTP, SSE, pricing
internal/agent   turn loop, conversation state, compaction, sessions
internal/tools   the tool registry and the tools
internal/skills   discovery and parsing of SKILL.md
internal/approval  allow / deny / ask, with shell analysis
internal/metrics JSONL event log
internal/ui      line-based terminal rendering
internal/tui     full-screen Bubble Tea front end
evals            task suite and runner

Two rules hold the shape: agent never imports ui or tui, so the eval runner can drive the loop headless; and every tool returns (string, error) where the error is text the model reads, not an exception the harness swallows. A failed edit is a normal event in the transcript.

The TUI obeys the first rule through two one-way hatches. Events reach it via agent.Observe, forwarded into the Bubble Tea loop with Program.Send, which is safe from the agent's goroutine. Approvals go out the same way and then block the agent on a reply channel until a key arrives. That channel is buffered and the wait honours the turn's context, so neither side can strand the other.